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Editor’s Note: This article is from the WeChat public account “CV Intelligence” (ID: CVAI2019), first launched in Tencent Technology, 36 is authorized to release. Author: Yangjian Kai Editor: Zhang Lijuan county government, the semiconductor chip stand. In the local government’s investment landscape, the chip industry chain company is becoming the guest who has been lonely but is now the most to be seen. Against the background of slower economic growth, unsustainable land finance, and increasingly fierce economic competition between regions, large chip semiconductor projects are becoming the slogan of local governments. From Wuhan, Hefei, Xi’an, to Chengyu and Xiaquan Spring, these second-tier cities have realized the big gold mine of the chip semiconductor industry. Although there is no technology research and development talent and strength comparable to Beijing, Shanghai and other super cities, but with the opportunity of chip semiconductor manufacturers to open up the market, these second-tier cities began to use the land, policy and market dividends to start nuggets in the chip semiconductor industry chain. However, for second-tier cities, it is not easy to talk about “core”. The matching and landing of the fab factory, the IDM factory and the local government is like a costly love. Wuhan Xinxin, the core of Wuhan for 13 years, is the cornerstone and soul of this city’s chip industry. Wuhan·Hanjiang Night Scene In 2006, Wuhan Xinxin began construction. In 2008, Wuhan Xinxin began mass production, and its investment scale was tens of billions. It was the only 12-inch chip production plant in Central China at that time. At the beginning of its establishment, due to the lack of talent and technology in Hubei Province and Wuhan City, Wuhan Xinxin was managed by SMIC. From 2006 to 2012, Wuhan Xinxin almost duplicated all the twists and turns of Shanghai-made chip makers. The way to go, the thunder of the scorpion, one is not less. First, the new core tried to cut into the international market with DRAM as its main product, but the mass production has ushered in a rambling of DRAM prices, and the company had to switch to flash memory. In contrast, Shanghai Huahong is more fortunate than Xinxin. Huahong has seized the tail of the DRAM uplink cycle and achieved profitability in mass production. Wuhan Xinxin started construction in 2006 and went into production in 2008. When the financial crisis and the semiconductor cycle turned sharply, the tail of the cycle did not catch. Subsequently, Wuhan Xinxin teamed up with the US flash memory company Fesso Semiconductor to try to rely on the technology of the hopper to move to the existing market to survive. But unfortunately, the last straw in 2008 was also difficult to protect itself. At that time, Feisuo was on the verge of bankruptcy, and Wuhan Xinxin had no orders. The overall decline of the semiconductor cycle, whether it is DRAM or flash memory, is faced with the tragic situation of double price and price. Under the condition that foreign manufacturers lose money and can not operate at full capacity, domestic manufacturers will suffer from the shackles. The cycle is sluggish, and only the landlord’s family has surplus food. Wuhan Xinxin is waiting to be fed, but it attracts the attention of the vultures. At that time, foreign acquisitions such as TSMC and Micron were all interested in Wuhan Xinxin. At that time, Wuhan Xinxin has been mass-produced, and it is managed by SMIC. The foreign chip makers bought Wuhan Xinxin, which means that it has added a mature production base in the Chinese market, and it can also contain competitors in the Chinese market. One stone two birds. Fortunately, in 2011, SMIC and the Wuhan Municipal Government reached an agreement to establish a joint venture company. However, in the previous article on CV’s intellectual knowledge, “Going to the Core of the Beach”, it was also mentioned that the chairman of the SMIC, Jiang Shangzhou, played a key role in this matter. But unfortunately, in 2011 Jiang Jiangzhou died, SMIC is far from recovering from internal and external problems. SMIC and the new core have become difficult brothers and brothers, and the two stay together, and no one is too good. Subsequently, it was a coincidence that in August 2012, the original SMIC COO Yang Shining joined Wuhan Xinxin. In 2013, Wuhan Xinxin was independent from SMIC. After pulling the mega-single of the innovative memory chip and the NAND memory process from 55nm to 32nm, Wuhan Xinxin won the favor of the big fund and won the competition in the national storage base. In 2016, the national storage base was launched in Wuhan, and the Yangtze River storage was established on the basis of Wuhan Xinxin. In the long history of Wuhan Xinxin’s development, when the government subsidies met the right corporate leaders and excellent opportunities, the company achieved a Jedi reversal. The instantaneous change from the ugly duckling to the white swan can’t avoid the helplessness of Wuhan Xinxin in the early stage of operation.地方政府与外资合作、实现技术引进,但关键问题在于:波橘云诡的半导体周期不随人的主观意志变化,一旦失去强援,地方政府上哪里去找投出去的真金白银?所以,聪明的做法是内外市场兼重、两条腿走路的策略。一位芯片业内资深人士表示,武汉新芯的成功,很有一股湖北人的狠劲在,时机也各种凑巧,放到其他地方,这样的项目可能就黄了。作为一个地方政府的芯片项目,武汉新芯在前期的困境,在于缺乏、或者说也没有能力与资源,划分到一个全国性的芯片细分市场,当时政府有能力主导的细分芯片市场估计也没有了。同时,地方政府在充分的市场化经营中又存在天生的短板,因而武汉新芯长达六七年的阵痛期也就在所难免。如此昂贵的学费,交起来着实心疼。但同属中部的合肥,找到了一条无比精巧隐匿的捷径,在武汉还在大交学费的时候,合肥却早已在高科技产业中赚的盆满钵满,并且在近年进军存储产业中更是豪掷千金。合肥有个京东方为什么合肥的底气这么足?2017年底,在京东方合肥10.5代线产品下线前,合肥新闻联播做了一个连续三期的《合肥有个京东方》的新闻联播。在接受媒体采访时,京东方科技集团副总裁、合肥区域总经理张羽表示:合肥是京东方的福地。十年前,中国是“缺屏少芯”,时至今日,这个词变成了“缺芯少魂”。在半导体集成电路(也就是通常所说的芯片)还在苦苦挣扎之际,半导体显示行业已经异军突起。1992年,当年轻的厂长王东升走马上任北京电子管厂之时,他面临一个棘手的烂摊子,一如当时中国许多地方的电子管厂。在陈旧、落后的电子管厂的遗址上,如何才能建立一个充分市场化、具有国际竞争力的高科技企业?那些后来成为传奇、并撑起中国半导体产业的民族企业,在事后看来不约而同的选择了技术自主的路径。在无数国营电子管厂的遗骸上,长出了江阴长电和北京京东方这样的世界级企业。尽管这两家企业前身都是“电子管”厂,但在强势企业领导人的敏锐市场洞察和大刀阔斧改革之下,他们都在行业周期的低谷选择投资最难、最有市场前景的前沿科技。从1993年京东方成立、2000年登陆A股、2003年收购韩国现代的面板业务、到因屏周期血亏连续两年ST,京东方的业绩和股价就像过山车一样惊险刺激,而这些都不能阻挡地方政府对于京东方屏产业的趋之若鹜。京东方一开始在北京兴建5代线,每年带动缴税数十亿,北京市政府还从因屏周期景气上升的股价中获利不菲。高端制造业的乘数效应,由此可见一斑。随后2008年,合肥市政府在与深圳市政府的竞争中胜出,将京东方6代线招徕到了合肥,总投资额高达175亿元,而2007年合肥市总计用来发展的财政资金也就是30亿左右,除了85亿的银行贷款,剩下的60亿资本金缺口谁来补?政府的信用背书为市场化融资奠定了基石,在看到政府出钱之后,A股的机构投资者和散户纷至沓来。这样的操作不止一次,并且屡试不爽。在《合肥有个京东方》的新闻联播中,合肥官方媒体说合肥市政府的操作已经被列入了商学院的教科书。每当京东方有新产线要投资,合肥市政府平台、京东方A股上市平台齐上阵,为京东方的融资之路开辟光明大道。合肥市政府与京东方,犹如天作之合。京东方为合肥市政府带来的好处,是显而易见的:首先是名,2010年,6代线的投产结束了我国大尺寸液晶面板全部依赖进口的局面;其次是实惠,京东方在合肥不仅投资的是生产线,还包括了智能制造工厂和数字医院等项目,截至2017年底,京东方在合肥的投资已超1000亿,即使只有10倍的乘数效应,京东方能够带动的总的GDP,也已经超过了合肥市一年的GDP总量,这还不是按照半导体工业100倍的乘数效应来算。京东方撑起了整个合肥经济,这样的论断毫不夸张。并且,最重要的一点是,合肥市的高科技生态已然是“鸡生蛋、蛋生鸡、鸡和蛋都留在合肥不想走了”。在《合肥有个京东方》新闻联播中,京东方配套供应商合肥三利谱光电科技厂长任海东现身说法,说当时企业选址在武汉还是合肥犹豫过,但最终定址合肥,现在三利谱光电给京东方供货可以做到零库存。合肥与武汉争雄之心,由此可见端倪。王凯(化名)曾有过芯片的创业经历,现任职一家国内知名投资机构的芯片半导体领域负责人。王凯对CV智识表示,仅算一下合肥市政府平台所持有的京东方股票,巅峰时期的浮盈就有上百亿。合肥市在京东方上赚了钱,走出来一条成功的模式,现在也正在大手笔投资芯片产业,补足产业上的短板。并且,合肥发展芯片产业,“上下同欲”,从国家(大基金、工信部等)、省、市、区层面都是非常认可的,并且长时间的历练让基层有了实际操作的经验,这是合肥相对于其他地方不可比拟的优势。在合肥市2017年左右开始的芯片产业布局中,有两个项目最为引人注目。其一是合肥建投和中国台湾地区晶圆代工企业力晶合作的晶合集成,旨在为京东方解决配套的面板驱动(LCD driver)芯片供应问题,其实还是在京东方那个“鸡蛋”生态圈里面;其二是与兆易创新合作的合肥长鑫,作为一只“省队”,合肥长鑫最近风头无两,但对于合肥市政府来说,合肥长鑫的存储芯片大业是一个全新的尝试,独立于京东方的那个“鸡蛋”生态圈,合肥长鑫能否闯出一条路来还有待观察。根据王凯的观察,从2017年开始,已经可以在上海、深圳等地频频见到合肥市区一级别的招商局工作人员,合肥正在与南京等城市争抢芯片产业链上下游的项目,承接来自一线芯片重镇的产业外溢。与江苏省内诸多地市的策略类似,合肥也在走内外兼重的道路,无论是内资芯片公司,还是外资公司,都在积极引进。而在今年,王凯感受到的一点明显的变化,就是合肥市的招商人员跟产业界人士强调,合肥已不再属于中部地区,合肥是长三角“三省一市”(安徽、江苏、浙江、上海)的一部分。从区一级别的招商局来看,王凯认为安徽与江浙沪的风格是很像的。“如果你跟江苏各个地市的招商局有打交道,你会发现,他们招商局的局长姿态都很低,都是销售型的人才,遇见芯片公司都要把他们给招过来,安徽也是这种风格,很明显非常不同于中西部的招商官员”,王凯如是表示。纵观合肥市的芯片半导体产业链发展历程,合肥之创举,确是“敢为天下先”。在现行的产业政策体系和金融体系内,合肥市政府最大程度利用了所有的资源,为区域内的灵魂企业—京东方加上了前所未有的杠杆,而合肥市这么大一盘赌局最后也成功了,这离不开地方主政官员的判断力、决心。当然,也更离不开一点,那就是京东方数十年如一日的高研发投入。从这一点来讲,合肥市政府和京东方是一荣俱荣、一损俱损的。Such an incomparably successful case requires close coordination between the “officials, production, integration, learning, and research”. There is a link between the two, which is a blow to the high-tech industry, and the formation of such a strict operating system of the technology industry, It depends on “the right place and the right place” and “the same desire.” In the second-line core business of foreign-funded chip factories in 2012, the giant Samsung storage project in the chip field landed in Xi’an. As a purely foreign-invested project, Samsung’s operation in Xi’an was very successful. Wang Kai said to CV that Samsung has landed in Xi’an and is planning at the national level. The final site was settled in Xi’an. This project is very obvious to the local social economy. Koreans come to restaurants, clubs and schools opened by Koreans. All of them are getting up. As for the combined effects of land appreciation, taxation and employment, it is even more self-evident. “But for pure foreign-funded factories, we can only count economic accounts, not technical accounts,” Wang Kai said. How to calculate the technical account? Because China’s chip semiconductors have too much debt, and must also consider the issue of patent sources, many local governments have chosen to cooperate with foreign manufacturers, local governments to pay and land, in exchange for technology transfer of foreign-funded factories. But the process of this technology transfer is obviously full of twists and turns. The core project in Chengdu was previously unsuccessful in Chongqing, and it ended in abortion in Chengdu. According to the report of Jiwei.com, the factory was built because of the quality problems of the project. The Fujian Province and the UMC cooperated with Fujian. Jinhua project, because of the patent dispute of Micron is in a state of suspension. Wang Kai believes that local government officials will play a vital role in the development of the chip semiconductor industry in the region. As long as the chief officials are from semiconductors, they will never miss the opportunity to revitalize the local economy with the chip industry. Because they are too aware of the huge driving effect of this industry. However, because the chip semiconductor industry is too difficult to understand, the threshold is very high, and this circle is relatively small. After the departure of the official officials, the chip project of the launch can still run. Many times, it is necessary to ask a question mark. If it fails, it will fail. The money is basically drowning. At the same time, Wang Kai told CV Intelligence that the initiative of the district (county) level officials, especially the investment officials, is crucial to the development of the regional chip industry ecology. Officials at the provincial and municipal levels transferred to the transfer, but after the project was settled, they would not run. What is the follow-up development? It is also to see how the officials at the district and county level can operate and build this industrial ecology. In Xi’an, Chengdu, Wuhan, Jinjiang and other places, the initiative of district and county officials is quite different from that of the Yangtze River Delta. Wang Kai believes that the development of the chip semiconductor industry in the above places has the problem of insufficient investment enthusiasm. The Samsung project has been in Xi’an for many years. In addition to the upstream and downstream brought by Samsung itself, the investment projects brought by the District Investment Promotion Bureau are few. In contrast, Nanjing attracted a TSMC, and its officials were more active. They ran to Shanghai every day, recruiting chip companies, and enriching chips upstream and downstream around TSMC. The situation in Wuhan, Chengdu and Xi’an is similar. Xinxin has developed a small decade in Wuhan, but its driving effect is limited. Now with the Yangtze River storage, the situation may change after mass production. The business environment in Chengdu is similar to that in Wuhan. Gexin is also a big project, but it has a miscarriage. As for Fujian Jinhua, it may be that Fujian Province used to focus on real estate, shoemaking and other industries, and suddenly came to a chip semiconductor. Local officials needed a long learning time. In the case that the learning ability, willingness and experience of the high-tech industry in the local grassroots departments cannot keep up with, the changes in any external factors of the project may cause greater shocks, and the local investment plan will be caught off guard. Taking the grid core project as an example, the project focuses on the low-power FD-SOI feature process. The domestic market is not enough to support this project. At the same time, the industrial cluster of FD-SOI is concentrated in Shanghai, and the grid core was in early 2018. The high-level changes also led to the substantial abortion of the Chengdu core project. All the above-mentioned factors are not reversed by the local government’s day and night. However, the quality of the foundry’s engineering quality is at a relatively junior level. If the local government’s own basic work is not done well, the money will go out. I am afraid that I will come up with a pile of scrapped iron and iron that has been abandoned, let alone the multiplier effect of the chip industry. Under the premise of doing basic homework, partners also need to be judged cautiously.中国台湾地区资深媒体人、TechEdge创办人林宗辉向CV智识表示,台湾地区近来有部分芯片半导体企业与不少地方政府合作,因其本身可能具备一些技术类型,为了进入大陆市场,经台湾地区当局审查后,可以将一些大陆有需求的技术转移。然而需要注意的是,这些企业有部分可能过去声誉不佳,技术来源可能不明确,亦或夸大技术层次,虽与地方政府的需求一拍即合。但这些台湾地区企业管理层并非走长线发展,而是偏向“杀鸡取卵”,在部分技术专利来源不可靠的情况下,合作方需要慎重考察。结语家底殷实,人杰地灵,才能做得了芯片。无论是武汉、合肥,还是西部的西安和成都,无不是举全省之力建设的省会城市。在芯片战争的PK中,只有那些有钱、有人、有决心,还有谋略和智慧的城市,才能在二线城市的竞争中成为佼佼者。而那些很早就意识到芯片半导体等高科技产业重要性的地方政府,在一开始的产业竞争中就走在了前列。随着大的核心项目相继落地,城市的科技产业上下游逐渐配套成型,由此形成的集聚效应帮助城市进一步巩固其既有优势,同时,产业集聚所带来的以乘数效应释放的正外部性(包括了税收、就业、人才、房价等),会强化地方政府的政策正反馈,最终使地方政府的产业政策得到延续。从这个角度来讲,一个大的芯片项目,乃至一个核心的科技公司,与一个城市的成长是相辅相成的。在芯片半导体产业链中,居于核心地位的fab厂与IDM厂至关重要,一个城市只要能做起来一个成功的fab厂和IDM厂,整个产业链都能够得到充分的带动。大的芯片半导体项目的流产,对于一个城市来说是巨大的打击,因为这意味着一个城市由此失去了构建生态的能力。以成都为例,尽管这个城市在如电源芯片等领域积聚了一些实力,中小芯片公司尚可,但中芯成都厂和格芯的先后挫折,使城市错失了两个极佳的大发展机遇。板凳要坐十年冷,在辛辛苦苦搞了十几年科技产业后,武汉、合肥这两个中部城市开始登上科技之巅。而一些城市着急匆忙上马,不吸取技术引进的历史教训,很明显有一些已经交了数额不菲的学费。对于芯片半导体产业,我们不妨多一些耐心,少一些急眼,用钱毕竟还是买不来技术。二线城市芯片半导体产业之强弱格局,反映出一个问题:地方政府自己搞芯片半导体项目,面临一个非常陡峭的学习曲线。如果是比较强势、带动作用比较强的外资厂商,如三星、台积电等,地方政府自己要学习的比较少,因为外资厂不给你技术,人家把所有的问题都自己解决了。但如果是联合外资厂搞技术引进,其难度不可谓不小,因为企业与政府角色互博的问题,地方政府可能需要付出相当高的学习成本,因为地方上的两种角色,本质上地方政府要经过两条学习曲线的试错与历练,一条是怎么去搞产业政策、服务好产业,并形成产业体系,一条是怎么去办好一个市场化的企业,而后者往往难于登天。半导体之路道阻且长,二线追“芯”需深思。参考资料:1、芯事,谢志峰、陈大明;2、合肥新闻联播;3、格芯转型、阵痛成都,集微网;4、合肥新兴产业资本局:国资力挺促千亿投资落地,参与定增浮盈百亿,中国经营报。

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