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The Meizu Shui in the domestic mobile phone defeat: the former “small but beautiful”, and ultimately lost to the wayward

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Editor’s note: This article is from the micro-channel public number “Party Research Society” (ID: jiafangribao), Author: Party Research Society, the exclusive debut at Artesyn Technologies, without authorization, shall not be reproduced. 36氪 authorized to reprint. IDC data from authoritative research institutions show that in the first quarter of this year, in the global market, the market share of Huawei, OPPO, vivo and Xiaomi mobile phone manufacturers reached 42%. Another report by Counterpoint, a research institute, also shows that in the Chinese market, these four companies have monopolized more than 70% of the market. With Huawei, OPPO, vivo, and Xiaomi’s position in the domestic mobile phone camp completely stable, the living space left to other competitors is also less and less, and the well-known mobile phone brands such as Jinli, Meizu, and Coolpad have gradually gone down. Party A Research Institute recently launched a series of planning, re-launched domestic mobile phone defeat, from these mobile phone manufacturers, summed up valuable experience and lessons. The third period: Meizu Shui against the Chinese mobile phone industry two big scorpions have made two similar conclusions on the mobile phone market. In 2017, Xiaomi, founder and chairman of Xiaomi, said: “There is no company in the world that can successfully reverse the decline in mobile phone sales, except for Xiaomi.” In 2016, Huawei terminal CEO Yu Chengdong predicted that in the next five years, most of the domestic production Mobile phone manufacturers will die, and there are only 3-4 left. The current Chinese mobile phone market is moving closer to the “ultimate curse” of the big brothers. The pattern of four head manufacturers of Huami OV has been fixed. LeTV, Gionee, and Coolpads have already been out of the game, Meitu mobile phones have been invested in Xiaomi; 360 “slow down” the mobile phone business, and turned to the development of old-age watches, although the hammer still survives, Luo Yonghao also returned to the sky. The next one seems to be left with Meizu. 01 Xiaomi’s teacher research institute, Sino, announced the 2018 China smartphone data report. The report shows that Meizu’s sales volume is only 9.48 million units, which is nearly 46% lower than the sales volume of nearly 20 million units in 2017. In this list, Xiaomi, who has always been regarded as a “student” by Huang Zhang, ranks sixth in the rankings, with sales of 47.96 million units. Although Xiaomi and Meizu are ranked sixth and seventh, the annual sales of Meizu Less than one tenth of Xiaomi. As a man who refused to rely on Lei Jun, Huang Zhang still firmly believed that Xiaomi was the result of “stealing a teacher” from Meizu. In fact, Meizu is also one of the early domestic manufacturers to enter the smart phone field. With its relatively excellent product strength, Meizu Mobile has also successfully harvested a large number of fans in the early days of its birth, becoming the representative of the “small and beautiful” market in the domestic smartphone market. In terms of sensitivity to the industry, Huang Zhang has always been ahead of his peers. In 2006, with the explosion of Meizu E3 and miniPlayer, which rivals the iPod, Meizu successfully climbed the top of the domestic MP3 player, with annual sales exceeding RMB 1 billion. At the same time as the top sales, Huang Zhang, who stands at the top of the industry, has vaguely felt the end of the MP3 era. Just as I switched from VCD to MP3 in the early years, Huang Zhang made a decision to transform: to do mobile phones. In 2007, Meizu officially released news that it will launch its own brand mobile phone. At this time, Nokia and Motorola are still in the market, and Apple just launched the first iPhone at the beginning of the year. However, Meizu’s first mobile phone was not born smoothly. It was released in 2007 and it was not until February 2009 that the new product was officially launched. Huang Zhang spent 3 years, changed the 34 version of the design, and finally made a mobile phone called M8. On the day of the M8 launch, each store has a long queue. A fan even turned 4 provinces from the field, and dumped 3 trains and 1 car, just rushing to line up. The M8 officially listed in the two months of sales reached 100,000 units, and sales within five months exceeded 500 million yuan. In 2011, Huang Zhang’s Meizu M9, which was polished for two years, launched a line of rushing to buy waves. M9 became the Android machine of the year. Meizu ushered in the highest point. In the era of domestic mobile phones, the market concentration is not high. Under the grassy environment, all kinds of companies can attract certain users to purchase. For example, Meizu has a certain accumulation, and companies that focus on small and beautiful can also live vividly.After Meizu’s series of products, M9, MX, MX2, MX3, etc., have been praised as one of the most beautiful domestic mobile phones by fans, and achieved good results. By 2014, Meizu initially established two major product lines, Meizu MX Series and Charm Blue Note. 02 Lost direction Meizu’s loss seems to have started from the “expansion” after Ali’s investment. On February 9, 2015, Meizu Technology and Alibaba jointly announced that Alibaba will invest $59 million in Meizu. On May 11, 2015, Meizu Technology and Jingdong officially reached a strategic cooperation, and the two parties signed an annual purchase agreement of 6 billion yuan. Ali’s investment has, to a certain extent, made Meizu, who pursues small and beautiful, fall into the realm of “getting addicted to death”. Under the premise of having money and guaranteeing sales channels, Meizu also began to hold high and high-scoring strategies, and further expanded its influence and promoted brand value through the marketing campaign. In 2015, Meizu opened a total of 6 press conferences at the National Convention Center, inviting many stars to help out, including many popular singers such as Deng Ziqi, Wang Feng and Chopsticks Brothers. The sales of Meizu directly rushed to 20 million units in 2015. The Chinese smartphone market is quietly changing when Meizu is dying. In the incremental market shift to the stock market, consumption upgrades have brought another round of market dividends. As a result, the Friends of the brand seized the opportunity to collectively erupt in the field of high-end machines and won more market share. It is not difficult to see that Meizu and Huang Zhang at that time especially wanted to give Ali a beautiful transcript. Meizu has just completed the shipment of 20 million units, and Meizu has set a standard of 25 million units in 2016. In 2016, Meizu released 14 products a year, opened 12 press conferences, invited more than a dozen singers to the town, and worked closely with OV. However, Meizu’s sales increased slowly this year, only 200 more than in 2015. Wantai, which is 22 million units, is clearly behind the growth rate of ov. Cartography: From the perspective of products, Party A’s products include Meizu’s MX, PRO, Charm Blue Note, E, A, Metal and other dozens of series, the product line is chaotic, it is difficult to distinguish. What’s even more embarrassing is that none of these dozens of products have exploded. Because of the catch-up, Meizu missed the best opportunity to hit the high-end market. Because of the mutual interference between the low-end and mid-end product lines, the investment in high-end machines was slightly insufficient, which also disrupted its own product line. “Your Meizu’s reputation in the past few years is not generally good, although the sales are not good, but the quality is not said, the m8 of that year is also a popular moment, but I have not seen the same as I am now, now I have money to think about making money. It’s crazy.” A Meizu user who knows the truth “speaks in the wind” expresses his dissatisfaction. In the pursuit of market share at the expense of brand value, Meizu has been in a state of exhaustion in 2015 and 2016. The mistakes made by Huang Zhang after his return came to make Meizu completely smashed in the layout of high-end machines. In 2017, Huang Zhang personally took charge of the mobile phone business. Huang Zhang’s other reform of Meizu is to improve its positioning. It has changed Meizu’s past “literary art” style and the low-end image brought by Charm Blue, and directly positioned “Business High-end”. In order to achieve this goal, Huang Zhangli invited former Huawei mobile phone executives and TCL mobile phone head of China, Yang Lan, to join and appointed Yang Lan as CMO, hoping that he can lead Meizu to return to glory. Pro 7 released in the middle of the year is the first high-end business flagship of Meizu. This mobile phone is designed by Bai Yongxiang, and the biggest highlight is “double-sided screen design”. Yang Hao established a starting price of 2,880 yuan for this model, which is nearly 400 yuan higher than the previous generation Pro 6. However, after being released, the Pro 7, which was highly anticipated, became the most tragic Waterloo in the history of Meizu. The core user of Meizu is a young person. For the design of Pro 7, the “feeling friend” is ugly and does not pay for new products. In terms of technological innovation, Meizu has once again chased the wrong trend. The design of Pro 7’s screen design is not high in the market for pursuing “full screen”, and it has suffered price cuts in two months. Pro7 is a thousand yuan machine. The Pro7 suffered a fiasco. At that time, the cost of customizing the screen was 16 million US dollars. Meizu had already placed millions of orders, but it had a backlog of hundreds of thousands. The vitality and morale were hit hard.The fiasco of Pro7 became the last straw to crush Meizu, and the chain reaction that followed it made the Meizu, which had gone downhill, become chaotic. After Yang Lan took office, he brought his own marketing team, which made the original Meizu marketing team marginalized, and later triggered the 2018 Meizu infighting event. At that time, Zhang Jia, the director of Meizu Wenchuang, publicly spit on the Weibo public opinion Yang Lan, and exposed the Meizu 15 series conference 60 million yuan of project details, which meant that it was full of pockets. Then Mei Jia Wenchuang Director Zhang Jia was expelled from Meizu. Three months later, Yang Lan also left. Yang Lan, who was highly hoped by Huang Zhang, had not been able to save Meizu in the water fire for more than a year. Instead, Meizu Company was cast a notorious “corruption incident”, and its brand value fell greatly. At this time, Meizu is already a chicken feather. From 2015 to 2017, it was the most golden three years for China’s mobile phone manufacturers to transform and upgrade. Meizu gradually lost its own genes and rhythm in the process of imitating the industry leader. In 2015, Meizu stared at Xiaomi. In marketing, Meizu constantly touched porcelain. In terms of strategy, Meizu launched the charm blue against the red rice; in 2016, the millet model was in trouble, Meizu began to learn OPPO and vivo, and competed by sea tactics. Offline market. In 2017, Huang Zhang began to learn the most successful Huawei in China as a high-end machine. Meizu’s mobile phone consumer positioning is no longer a young man in the past. Often, a well-developed company has few major changes or resignations from its executive team. But at the recent Meizu 16S series conference, we can’t see the familiar old faces of the year. In 2018, Bai Yongxiang, the president of one of the three major Meizu backbones, left. At the beginning of 2019, Yang Yan, senior vice president of Meizu Software Core Design, also left. On May 2, 2019, Tianyanchao revealed that Li Nan had been removed from the main personnel of Meizu Technology. “Meizu Three Musketeers” has fallen apart. When it comes to the success or failure of Meizu, in any case, it is impossible to circumvent its soul character Huang Zhang. In fact, the destructive power of Meizu’s biggest “personnel change” is also no match for Huang’s “the dragon is not seen at the end” and the almost paranoid attitude towards the product. At the beginning of 2011, Huang Zhang faded out of the company and lived in the house for three years. He designed the products at home all day long, planted vegetables in the garden, held children, played HiFi, and only once a month. One night before the Spring Festival in 2014, Bai Yongxiang personally came to Huang Zhang’s home with several Meizu executives such as Li Nan and Yang Yan. Meizu’s shipments in the previous year were only over 2 million units, and the shipments of Xiaomi and Glory have reached tens of millions. In 2014, Huang Zhang had announced a comeback, saying that “Da Che Daxiao was a little late”, but this has only been maintained for a few months, because Huang Zhang believes that he has been meeting for a few days and nights, and he needs to rest after a tiring body. The company affairs were returned to Li Nan. According to the “All Weather Technology” report, in 2017, Huang Zhang recently announced that he had “returned” and he did not return to work at the company. Some even recalled that from 2014 to 2018, Huang Zhang actually announced the “return” frequency internally as “once a year”. “In the years of Meizu, I often heard that Huang Zhang said that it was out of the mountain, but soon after hearing that he announced his comeback again, many employees did not know when he was reclusive. If the boat is broken, it can be repaired, no good. The oars can be polished continuously, but when there is no good helmsman, the boat will continue to lose direction. As the founder of Meizu, Huang Zhang has always been defined as a perfectionist, and many myths are circulating on the rivers and lakes. For example, Huang Zhang The famous saying is that the product is the first, and the others are the second. In addition, Huang Zhang’s almost paranoid “willfulness” for the product has also brought many troubles to Meizu. When designing Meizu 15, because the CPU is in the middle, if the lens Also placed in the middle of the device, the phone fever will be difficult to control, software department, structural department does not recommend this layout, but Huang Zhang finally adhered to this design. In the choice of SoC, Huang Zhang because he does not like Qualcomm’s “overbearing”, Working with MediaTek for a long time, this also makes Meizu “gradually farther away” from other mobile phone brands in terms of hard power. Huang Zhang repeatedly retired, Meizu adjusted four times. Architecture, changing the play several times, but going around in circles, again and again, Meizu gradually sinking.03 “最好”的魅族机海战、高端化、“梦想机”相继失败后,魅族选择做回“安安静静的美男子”。从魅族16开始,魅族就努力向主流靠近,这一点在今年4月份发布的魅族16s系列上体现的尤为明显。第一梯队的旗舰机中,魅族终于用上了骁龙855,虽然产品没有突出的爆点,但性能、颜值没有明显短板,价格也在旗舰机合理区间,这也是魅族竭尽全力能做到的最好的一款产品。与之相比,上一年的魅族发布的旗舰机魅族15系列还被黄章称为“梦想机”,骁龙 660, Exynos 8895两款芯片完全笼罩在骁龙 845 的阴影下,情怀溢价占很大比重。根据市场变化相机而动,也让魅族的竞争中不至于完全处于被动之中。今年618,魅族旗舰机型魅族16s价格直降499元,而5月30日才发布的魅族16Xs的首发价格也从1698元降至1499元。降价消息一出,魅族官博立马被首发购买的魅族用户们攻陷,场面一度非常尴尬。为了避免用户的负面情绪快速蔓延,魅族官方紧急出台政策——6月6日之前购买并激活使用的魅族16s用户,可领取总价值500元的魅族官网手机通用购机券。阿里投资后,魅族员工激增至4000人。在出货量骤降的背景下,魅族很难再负重前行,裁汰冗员必不可少。至今,魅族裁员计划依然在小规模地继续。从最巅峰时期的约4000人,到现在整个公司只剩下1000多人。陷入“缺钱”综合症的魅族也等来了一笔救命钱。5月2日,多家第三方查询工具显示,魅族股权出现变动,创始人黄章的持股比例由51.96%降低至49.08%,珠海国资委的入局,可能是魅族最后的机会。在魅族社区论坛里,黄章依然非常活跃,“魅友”也常常与他互动。每次发布会前,手机还没公布细节,他就已经开始在论坛上晒细节,提前剧透。小米9发布之后,黄章在社区里回复网友说:“想冲高端但眼高手低,贱惯了高不起来,贱人贱己贱行业”。虽然怼友商在当下显得有些不合时宜,但依旧能引来围观,毕竟,为了卖更多的手机,就连雷军都喊出“生死看淡,不服就干”的口号。人事动荡告一段落、资金落袋为安,新手机在配置方面的已经接近“主流”,黄章的据理力争,几乎可以认定,轻装上阵的魅族迎来了自己“最好的时候”。魅族的这些变化是其迈向正轨的表现,但又何尝不是日薄西山的无可奈何。04 尴尬的“小而美”魅族还有机会吗?从当下手机行业形势来看,2019年的中国手机市场可能并未给姗姗来迟的魅族留有一席位置。据GFK数据显示,2018年中国手机整体出货量为3.98亿台,其中,华为出货超1亿台,“OV”各7000万台,魅族昔日竞争对手小米手机的出货也达5000万台。而伴随着魅族15市场反应的持续冷淡,魅族该年全年手机销量仅为1000万台左右,同比下降40.5%。更糟糕的是,手机行业正在遭遇着全面下滑。IDC数据显示,2017年,全球智能手机出货量为14.63亿台,成为这个行业的首次出货量下跌。彼时,IDC预测称,该数字在2018年将有所回升,但事实上,当这一年结束时,出货量再次下跌了4.1%,而截至2019年第一季度,这一下跌趋势仍在延续。行业遇冷,除了苹果和“华米OV”五大头部品牌,中国市场的小众手机生存空间被持续压缩,在过去两年中,陆续退出市场的小众手机包括:酷派、金立、美图、锤子,不一而足。在2016年,IDC统计的手机出货量中,小众厂商的总占比尚有近4成,到2018年第四季度,该比例已跌至17.9%。However, the rules of the mobile phone market were clear, the head effect accumulated, and the appearance was homogenized. The perception and feel of each manufacturer improved to a certain level, and the mobile phone industry began to enter into a fierce battlefield. Only one item of screen, camera, processor and other hardcore technology innovations can be stimulated. No other mobile phone can be made more intelligent by the shape and feel, or the user-friendly system. Meizu hopes to return to a small and beautiful state, but such companies have not been too attractive to partners. “Small” means that there is no right to speak to upstream suppliers. The new mass production technology can’t be taken first. It can only be used in the head phone company. The upstream manufacturers are mature in mass production. When the first wave of heat in the market has passed, To. But the next wave of new technologies has emerged, and the user’s excitement has shifted. With stable shipments, it can gain the right to speak in the supply chain, and it has become a competitive point for mobile phone manufacturers. Manufacturers such as Meizu are in the weak side of the competition chain because of the decline in shipments. Without the right to speak in the supply chain, it is difficult to take the lead in product promotion. “Hunger Marketing” has become a past tense, and consumers have more choices if they can’t buy the products they want. The strangulation of the giants continues. “Ov and other companies have dug up at least 2/3 of us with twice the annual salary.” In April, the network circulated a private screenshot, which made the Meizu’s dilemma visible. Today, it is not difficult for us to guess that the mobility of Meizu personnel is not the same as that of friends and businessmen, and salary and welfare are also the main factors. Meizu is partial to Zhuhai. Compared with Huawei and Ov and other Shenzhen enterprises, Meizu’s salary has no advantage. The time left for Meizu is really not much. .

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